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Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
An Accommodation of State, Federal, and
International Interests
We all know from experience in our . . . country's political and
private affaris that problems unattended do not go away. . . . In-
deed, one of the greatest problems . . . today is to deal in absolute
terms with the distribution of rights in the [world's] coastal waters. In
each case, we must now examine the relative interests and find a
legal formula which accommodates them. This is not a mere matter
of compromise or "splitting the difference," but rather of building a
legal structure which is simultaneously responsive to the different
needs and interests.*
INTRODUCTION
EFFICIENT REGULATION AND use of the United States coastal
waters is the primary objective of the recently enacted Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA).' The FCMA extends
national fishery mangement jurisdiction outward 200 nautical miles
from shore. 2 For the first time a comprehensive management regime
has been established for the fishery resources off the United States
coasts. Additionally, the FCMA has played a key role in fostering a
new rule of customary international law relating to the unilateral ex-
tension of national jurisdiction over coastal waters.' Notwithstanding
*Statement of John Stevenson, head of the United States delegation to the
United Nations Seabeds Committee, presented at its March 18, 1971 meeting in
Geneva.
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265,
§ 104, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811-82 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as
FCMA]. The FCMA was signed into law by President Ford on April 13, 1976. On
March 1, 1977, fishery law enforcement officials began policing its provisions.
2 The FCMA is a mixture of numerous approaches previously proposed by bills
in Congress. For a list of the earlier proposals see Manguson, The Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976: First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine
Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 433 (1977).
a During 1976 eight countries extended their fisheries jurisdiction to 200
nautical miles. Members of the European Economic Community have also decided to
operate under a similar extension vis-s-vis nonmember countries. Moreover, Japan,
having recently decided to expand its territorial limits to 12 miles, is expected to ex-
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the sharp criticism levelled against the FCMA for its potentially
destructive effects on the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea
(LOS III),4 it nevertheless represents a feasible and workable solution
to the urgent problem of fishery resource protection.
The application and enforcement of the FCMA permeates state,
federal, and international fishery regulatory schemes. Conflicts arising
between federal and state schemes' present problems as fully com-
tend its fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles in the near future. See Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Mar. 30, 1977, at A-2, col. 4.
4 An often-voiced argument against the FCMA is that the legislation destroys ef-
forts of the United Nations LOS III Conference and induces other nations to make
broad territorial claims. Assuming that the successful unilateral extension of territorial
zones does lessen the incentive of coastal states to reach agreement at the LOS III, it is
still the geographically disadvantaged and developing nations that are actually causing
the deadlock in major areas of the Conference. For a critical response to the charges
against the FCMA based upon the possible disruptions to the LOS III see Manguson,
supra note 2, at 445. See generally Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Conflicts Between
a Future Law of the Sea Treaty and the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 451 (1977).
It is important to note that the FCMA recognizes the importance of the LOS III
negotiations and grants to the Secretary of Commerce the power to amend any regula-
tion within the FCMA to conform such regulation to the provisions of any comprehen-
sive treaty arrived at and ratified by the United States. FCMA, § 401, 16 U.S.C. §
1881 (1976)..
' Probably the most consistent thread running through the history of fishery
regulation in the United States is that of the Commerce Clause of the United States
Consitution. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 allows state regulation of fishing in territorial waters to
be within the police power of the state, provided there is no conflict with federal law.
See generally Note, Territorial Waters-Ownership and Control, 8 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 240,241-49 (1976).
Early cases repeatedly upheld state statutes regulating fishing by vessels engaged
in interstate commerce as a valid exercise of the state's police power so long as the
statutes were applicable to residents and non-residents alike, and the state had a
legitimate interest in the fishery and there was no conflicting federal law. Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
In reality, the states by virtue of federal inaction and authority given them by
the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) in 1953, were the only governmental units with com-
prehensive fishery management programs. When enacted, the SLA provided that the
states had ownership of the 3-mile marginal belt off their coastlines, but the federal
government was to retain paramount rights to this area for purposes of navigation,
commerce, national defense and international affairs. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1976).
The SLA implicitly places a limit on state rights to a seaward three-mile line and
made no provision for the extension of state boundaries beyond this point. Accord,
Note, The Three-Mile Limit: its Juridical Status, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 170 (1972).
Also in 1953, the Outer Continential Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) was passed
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plicated as those existing between national and international 6 concepts
of ocean management. It was not until the FCMA that the United
States began speaking with one voice, attempting to accommodate
state coastal interests within the context of national uniformity as well
which gave the Federal Government control over the submerged lands beyond the
three-mile marginal belt. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1976). The OCSLA has been read
narrowly by some commentators "to involve the federal government in the lucrative
practice of leasing offshore oil lands to oil companies for petroleum development."
Rathje, Saving Bryon's Sea: Federal and State Regulation of Oil Pollution from Ocean
Petroleum Production, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 485, 490-91 (1971).
By far the most extensive entry into the fishery regulation field prior to the
FCMA by the federal government was through the Federal Extra-Territorial Waters
Act of 1966, commonly known as the 12-Mile Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1091 et seq. (1970)
(repealed 1976). The 12-Mile Act was an important step in the unilateral extension of
exclusive fisheries regulation to 200 miles under the FCMA.
Until enactment of the FCMA in 1976, the Federal Government did no more
than act as a passive partner or custodian of the contiguous zone beyond the state's
territorial three-mile limit. This was reflected in the states ability to regulate fisheries
beyond their traditional three-mile territorial sea limitation. In Skiriotes, supra, the
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a fisherman under a Florida state statute for
using illegal diving equipment in the taking of sponges from the Gulf of Mexico six
miles off the Florida cost. Since the application of the statute involved no question of
international law or foreign relations, and the conviction raised questions of domestic
rights and duties, namely, the power of the state over its citizens and there was no
conflicting federal legislation, the Court reasoned that Florida could regulate the rights
of its own citizens beyond its territorial limit. 313 U.S. at 77. State regulatory powers
were further expanded in United States v. La., 363 U.S. 1 (1960), wherein the
Supreme Court determined that Congress had the power to grant submerged lands
beyond the three-mile limit to Texas and Florida "as a domestic matter which did not
necessarily affect United States claims regarding the territorial sea for international
purposes" because of the "special and limited character" of the jurisdiction to exploit
submerged lands. Id. at 31.
Therefore, until a clearly enunciated purpose was established by the federal
government a state was able to extend its fishery jurisdiction beyond the territorial
limits established by the SLA. Nonetheless, serious theoretical hurdles had to be over-
come. See generally Note, Territorial Jurisdiction -Massachusetts Judicial Extention
Act-State Legislature Extends Jurisdiction of State Courts to 200 Miles at Sea, 5
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 490 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Fisheries Jurisdiction].
I Prior to the passage of the FCMA, relevant international law, customs and
agreements on the subject of fishery regulation were confusing and with few excep-
tions, were accomplishing very little to help conserve and effectively manage the fishery
stocks of the high seas. For a comprehensive look at the state of affairs in international
fishery regulations before the FCMA see D. MCKERNAN, INTERNATIONAL FISHERY
POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES FISHING INDUSTRY (1968). See also Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 5, at 324-25.
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as providing the appropriate machinery for conforming international
agreements to the overall FCMA policies and objectives.7
The aim of this note is to examine the impact of the FCMA upon
these traditional regulatory and conservation efforts with primary em-
phasis given to fishery jurisdiction in coastal waters off the United
States. Analysis of the traditional approach to fishery jurisdiction is
considered in the context of a recently decided Supreme Court of
Alaska decision, State v. Bundrant.8 Bundrant accurately illustrates
the conventional interplay among state, federal, and international in-
terests and the treatment accorded each prior to the enactment of the
FCMA. Discussion of pertinent FCMA provisions and their impact
upon state and federal management interests follow. Finally, attention
is drawn to the FCMA's influence in the area of international fishery
affairs, including mandatory revision of certain United States treaty
obligations pursuant to the FCMA and the potential tensions which
could foreseeably result from such compliance.
Overall, this note demonstrates that the FCMA is a significant step
forward in the comprehensive management and conservation of sorely
depleted fishery resources in American coastal waters. Further, the
management regime under the FCMA provides sufficient flexibility
and sensitivity to fulfill individual states' needs while simultaneously
preserving the delicate balance between national and international
concerns over extraterritorial fishery regulation.
I. TRADITIONAL APPROACH: State v. Bundrant
On January 19, 1976, the Alaska Supreme Court, in a controversial
decision, upheld state emergency fishery regulations declaring certain
areas within and beyond Alaska's territorial waters closed to crab
fishermen. 9 By ruling in favor of the state's interests and thereby allow-
The two broad purposes of the FCMA are: (1) to extend the fisheries jurisdic-
tion of the United States to the newly created fishery conservation zone which has an
outer boundary of 200 nautical miles from shore, and (2) to impose a management
structure within the fishery conservation zone which is to be administered by the
Regional Fishery Management Councils and the Department of Commerce. FCMA, §§
101, 302(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1852 (1976).
' 546 P.2d 530 (Alas. 1976), appeal dismissed sub nor., Uri v. Alas., 97 S.Ct.
40 (1977).
9 Id. The case was denied a rehearing on March 26, 1976, less than one week
before the passage of the FCMA. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case to the trial court after rejecting arguments, inter alia, based on Congress' dor-
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ing extraterritorial fishery jurisdiction, the court rejected countervail-
ing federal and international concerns as presented by the appellees.
Consequently, Bundrant illustrates the traditional approach to judicial
resolution of fishery jurisdiction conflicts among competing interests. A
brief account of the background data giving rise to this decision is
necessary in order to fully understand its representative value.
In 1973, the Alaska Board of Fish and Game10 promulgated fishery
regulations calling for a maximum quota catch of twenty-three million
pounds of crabs "to be harvested in the Alaskan coastal waters.""
These measures were taken in an effort to avoid ,eventual depletion of
harvestable crabs taken from the Bering Sea and also to preserve the
fishery area at state determined sustainable yield levels. This quota was
made effective for the entire 1973-74 crabbing season. However, the
limitation was reached before the end of the crabbing season
whereupon the Bering Sea Shellfish Area (BSSA) was closed until June
15, 1974. Soon after the closing, several crab fishermen brought suit in
federal court seeking a preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of the Board's quota requirements.12 A three-judge district court heard
the case on April 30, 1974, and by enjoining the State of Alaska from
applying the crabbing restrictions granted the relief sought."' On June
15, 1974, just two weeks before the opening of the next crabbing
season, the Board issued a comprehensive set of emergency regulations
which prohibited the taking and the possession of crabs in a closed
area. 14 In effect, the Board once again designated fishery areas within
and beyond territorial waters as subject to its regulations.
mant commerce clause powers and the doctrine of federal preemption. Id. (Erwin, J.);
id. at 556 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring); id. at 559 (Connor, J., dissenting); id. at
556 (Boochever & Burke, JJ., not participating).
10 The Alaska Board of Fish and Game (Board) began efforts to regulate crab-
bing as early as 1969. The areas under regulation were both territorial and extra-
territorial fishery zones so designated.
11 The Board promulgated regulations creating the Bering Sea Shellfish Area
(BSSA) which included waters within and without Alaska's territorial limits. The
Board also prohibited possession or sale of crab taken "in violation of the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Board" when such crabs were taken in waters beyond
the state's territorial waters. 546 P.2d at 533.
If Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F.Supp. 430 (D. Alas. 1974).
Id. Following the Brooks decision, the Board repealed the enjoined regulations
and took alternative steps to govern crabbing in the BSSA for the upcoming season.
14 546 P.2d at 534. A system of designated closures was created by the Board
whereby "statistical areas" were delineated. The "statistical areas" consisted of:
1978
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The activity giving rise to the Bundrant decision occurred in a closed
area defined as "the waters of the Bering Sea and the Chukchi Sea,
including all tributory bays except Bechin Bay and Isanotski Strait . ..
north of 540 36' North Latitude . '. " Prior to July 1, 1974, the date
for the opening of the new crabbing season, an organization of Bering
Sea crab fishermen promulgated their own rules for the upcoming
crabbing season. The reactionist group's rules called for the crabbing
season to open on June 26.16 In response, the Board issued emergency
regulations delaying the opening of the season and vested the Board's
Commissioner with discretionary powers to open the season when
"general order can be restored and the State can be assured that
fishing will be conducted in a manner which will not jeopardize the
rights of law-abiding fishermen." 7 The fishermen who had been suc-
cessful earlier in gaining a preliminary injunction enjoining enforce-
ment of the Board's previous regulations' s petitioned the federal
district court for a temporary restraining order against the Board's
most recent regulations. The petition was denied and the fishermen re-
mained subject to the emergency regulations.' 9 The question presented
by that case, as well as by Bundrant, was whether the Board's
emergency regulations were applicable to waters beyond Alaska's tradi-
tional territorial limits.
A. Factual Setting
The appeal in State v. Bundrant represents the consolidation of
three individual cases in which all the appellees were granted lower
court dismissals. The State of Alaska's appeal charged the appellees
with extraterritorial activities prohibited by the emergency regulations,
possession in the state's waters of shellfish taken outside the territorial
(1) a registration area comprised of all waters . . .which are waters subject
to the jurisdiction of the state, and
(2) an adjacent seaward biological influence zone, comprised of all waters
...which are not part of the regulation area. Id.
Is Id.
14 However, even before June 26, 1974, it was demonstrated that a large number
of vessels engaged in crabbing in the Bering Sea.
1" 546 P.2d at 534. The Board's Commissioner also issued notice that the season
would not open until all illegal crab pots were removed from the area in question.
I$s See note 12 supra.
1" 546 P.2d at 534. The Bundrant opinion offers no citation to the district
court's denial of the temporary restraining order and one can only speculate as to the
grounds for the dismissal.
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limits, a violation of the old regulations, and a combination of both
extraterritorial activities and in-state possession.20
The first group of appellees, Uri et al., faced charges of possession
of king crab within a closed area between June 30 and July 24, 1974.21
All of the charged activities took place sixteen to sixty miles off the
Alaskan coast. Additionally, all but one of the appellees were residents
of states other than Alaska.2 2 In the lower court, the Uri defendants
moved for a dismissal on a number of grounds, including lack of
jurisdiction, the unconstitutional vagueness of the regulations, and an
illegal search of their crab pots.2" The motion was granted by the trial
judge. The court adopted the appellees' argument that the emergency
regulations had intruded upon and were in conflict with an area of ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction established by the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA), and therefore were preempted by the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.24 Implicit in the ruling was
the notion that extraterritorial fishery jurisdiction was a matter of
federal concern since it pervaded both national and international af-
fairs.
The second case involved in the appeal concerned a single ap-
pellee, Bundrant. He was charged with seven counts of possession of
migratory shellfish within a closed area in violation of the Board's
regulations. Bundrant's activities occurred within the three-mile ter-
ritorial limit of the State of Alaska during October 1973. Although
Bundrant was a legal resident of the State of Washington he never-
theless held commercial fishing licenses in Alaska. A dismissal motion
20 Id.
2' Id. Additional charges included possession of crab pots within a closed area
and having fished for crab in a closed area.
It It is interesting to note that Bundrant not only raised the question of the
state's ability to regulate extraterritorial fishery resources but also caused the court to
be divided on the question of jurisdiction over the parties. In Justice Erwin's opinion,
the question of in personam jurisdiction was summarily dismissed after a showing of
minimal contacts of the appellees with the State of Alaska. 546 P.2d at 535. However,
Justice Erwin did not totally foreclose the appellees from renewing their in personam
objection in the trial court again. Id. at 556 n.108.
Chief Justice Rabinowitz entered a concurring opinion addressing primarily this
question. In no unclear terms he asserted that the court had ample jurisdiction over
the parties. 546 P.2d at 559.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the dismissal was accompanied by a statement
noting that probable jurisdiction was lacking. 97 S.Ct. 40 (1977).
2 See 546 P.2d at 556 n.108.
24 Id. at 535. See notes 61-69 infra and accompanying text.
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was made on behalf of Bundrant clarning that the Board's regulations
were invalid due to Alaska's lack of extraterritorial fishery jurisdiction.
The motion initially was denied on March 27, 1974, but on September
10, 1974, following the federal district court's ruling in Hjelle v.
Brooks,25 the trial judge reconsidered and granted dismissal of Bun-
drant's charges. Although the Bundrant opinion fails to detail the
reasoning of the trial judge's dismissal motion, it is fair to assume that
a majority of the Alaska Supreme Court found that Bundrant as well
as Uri et al., had sufficient minimum contacts with the state in order
to confer the court with in personam jurisdiction."
The third case of the consolidation also involved a single appellee,
Kaldestad. He was charged with three counts of prohibited extrater-
ritorial conduct, and one count of possession within the three-mile ter-
ritorial limit of shellfish taken illegally outside of it.28 Kaldestad's case
was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that the alleged con-
duct occurred wholly outside of Alaska's territorial waters. 2
The state of the law in Alaska prior to Bundrant was that extrater-
ritorial fishery regulation was not permitted, since such regulation was
in conflict with federal statutory law and intruded into the field of in-
ternational affairs which was constitutionally entrusted to the
legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government.
Moreover, only one defendant was a resident of Alaska which, al-
though not causing the Supreme Court concern, curtailed the trial
courts ability to gain jurisdiction over the parties. The Bundrant deci-
sion abruptly changed the fishery jurisdiction law in the State of
Alaska. The Bundrant court overcame all federal statutory obstacles
challenging the Board's extraterritorial fishery regulation authority and
found "that the appellees had sufficient contacts with the state so as to
make the court's exercise of jurisdiction proper." 0 Viewed from a dif-
ferent perspective, it can be said that the Bundrant court was effec-
25 See note 12 supra.
2 546 P.2d at 534.
27 See note 22 supra. Appellee Bundrant presented a much clearer case for
minimum contact in personam jurisdiction. Bundrant maintained a warehouse for use
in processing his catch in Dutch Harbor, Alaska.
28 546 P.2d at 535. The fourth count against Kaldestad was basically the same
charge made against Bundrant. The only distinction was that Bundrant's violation fell
under the earlier (pre-1974) regulations, while Kaldestad's violation was based on the
Board's emergency regulations.
29 Id.
10 See note 22 supra.
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tuating the state's desire to preserve economically vital fishery resources
through the maintenance of quota limitations and "in some zones,
closing completely some of the more hard-pressed areas." 3' No matter
how the case is viewed it is certain that the Bundrant court faced an
unsettling result in any event.
B. Interest Balancing Approach-State Regulation and National
Uniformity
The approach taken by the Bundrant court was to stake out a local
interest which was sought to be protected, examine the scope of
federal powers, if any, over that local interest, and determine whether
state authority had been excluded or preempted. 2 The overall concern
became the basis and extent of the grant of enumerated powers to the
Federal Government, and the subsequent exercise of that power, cur-
tailing state authority over the same subject matter .3
The importance of fishing to Alaska's economy was made quite clear by the
court:
[F]ishing now constitutes the largest single industry . . . and crabbing is a
substantial portion of that activity. Exhaustion of this marine resource would
have a devastating impact on employment in this state .... Particularly crip-
pled would be those villages along our shores whose sole livlihood comes from
the sea. 546 P.2d at 540-41.
31 The recurring theme of a state's interest to regulate a local activity and the
limits on state powers that flow from national economic concerns is generally explored
in the context of the commerce clause powers of the United States Constitution.
However, similar restrictions on state authority may arise in connection with other na-
tional powers as well. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (foreign affairs
powers barring application of a state inheritance law.) See generally G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 277-372 (9th ed. 1975).
" State action may be barred by the federal commerce clause in two types of
situations. Where Congress has been silent and taken no action either expressly or im-
pliedly on a given subject matter, the objection to state authority is grounded on the
"dormant" commerce clause of art. I, § 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution. This
unexercised commerce clause power becomes a barrier to state action due to the need
for free trade within the national economy.
The second barrier arises when Congress has exercised its commerce clause
powers and indicated its policy or position in a given area. In this situation the
challenge to state authority rests on valid "supreme" national legislation which compels
inconsistent state action to give away. This rationale is grounded not only in the exer-
cise of art. I, § 8, cl. 3 powers alone, but also on the overriding effect of the
Supremacy Clause in art. VI of the United States Constitution.
Professor Gunther states that these two barriers to state action oftentimes present
themselves in overlapping situations. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 32, at 277.
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The majority and concurring opinions stated that the Fish and
Game Board was not preempted from extraterritorial fishery regulation
nor was the subject matter exclusively under federal control. In opposi-
tion, the dissent found that control of the sea and its resources was so
bound up with international affairs and national defense that Alaska's
extraterritorial crabbing regulations and state regulatory authority
thereunder was preempted. The confusion surrounding this question is
manifested by the fact that practically the same authority is relied
upon by both the majority and dissent in reaching opposite conclusions
of law.
The nub of the court's division lies in the varied interpretations ac-
corded the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) s 4 and the
Submerged Lands Act (SLA).15 Applying strict scrutiny to the
statutory language of the OCSLA, Mr. Justice Erwin's majority opinion
found that living resources were not affected. Mr. Justice Connor's dis-
sent, on the other hand, looked beyond the immediate language of the
OCSLA and concluded that the express policy and rationale giving
birth to the OCSLA called for state restraint in the exercise of ex-
traterritorial fishery regulation. The operative language of the OCSLA
reads:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the sub-
soil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the
United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power
of distribution .. .
This subchapter shall be construed in such a manner that the
character as high seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf
and the right to navigation and fishing shall not be affected.3 6
This language, coupled with the fact that the SLA "vested proprietary
title in each state to the lands and resources, including fish, beneath
and within the navigable waters of the state"" to an outer seaward
limit of three miles, caused Justice Erwin to conclude that the OCSLA
did not intend to speak to the regulation of organic resources, and
therefore such authority remained within the states.
The dissent responded by pointing to the rationale of the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. California, where a dispute
14 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1976).
11 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1976).
36 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b) (1976) (emphasis added).
37 546 P.2d at 537.
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centered around the issue of the proprietary exploitation of undersea
oil reserves. 38 The Court's opinion was premised on the recognition
that where there is a need for unified national authority in an area in-
extricably intertwined in international affairs, it becomes necessary for
the United States to exert its paramount rights and authority. Con-
ceding that the actual holding of the California decision may arguably
have been negated by the SLA, Justice Connor maintained that its ra-
tionale nevertheless lived on and squarely covered the facts presented
in Bundrant.39
Appellees' initial argument attempted to demonstrate that fishery
regulation beyond traditional territorial waters was subject to exclusive
federal domain. The reasoning behind this argument was based on the
Federal Government's authority to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce40 as well as manage foreign relations. 4 In response, the ma-
jority acknowledged the prohibitory force of the Commerce Clause
upon state action, but maintained that the issue at hand was fun-
damentally resolved by reaching an accommodation of the conflicting
state and federal interests at stake. 42 The court fashioned the essential
issue as being whether the state interest was outweighed by a national
interest of uniformity in the free flow of interstate and foreign com-
merce. Briefed on the foregoing principles, the court decided that the
Commerce Clause did not render the State of Alaska powerless to
regulate fisheries in waters beyond the three-mile limit. The court
stated that "as to the need for national uniformity of regulation, it
would appear doubtful that crabbing in the Bering is of such a nature
as to require such uniformity."' 4 Thus, the court reached the conclu-
sion that the Board may validly regulate fisheries seaward of the tradi-
tional three-mile limit since federal authority over this area was not ex-
38 332 U.S. 19 (1946).
'9 546 P.2d at 561-62 (dissenting opinion). In light of the stated purposes and
underlying policy of the FCMA Justice Connor may have been correct.
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, art. II, art. VI.
42 546 P.2d at 538. Under the "dormant" commerce clause rationale state laws
may be invalid even where there is no federal law or statutory policy directly ap-
plicable. If the state legislation burdens interstate or foreign commerce it may be
found invalid. Whether a state law in fact burdens interstate or foreign commerce is
determined by a court's taking evidence and balancing the state's interest against the
burden on commerce. Southern Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945) (in-
validation of state law requiring passenger and freight trains to be a prescribed
length.)
43 546 P.2d at 539. Contra, notes 45-46, 82-85 infra and accompanying text.
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clusive." Moreover, the court ruled that the conventional approach of,
local, non-uniform management of fishery resources was appropriate
since the Federal Government abstained from regulating fishing in
traditional territorial waters, despite its constitutional power to do so .4
In opposition to this position are those critics that view such
unilateral regulation over fisheries resources as being inconsistent with
and destructive of larger international efforts to deal with all the prob-
lems of the seas. The problems of fisheries jurisdiction and the effec-
tive conservation of fishing resources, it is contended, cannot be dealt
with in a vacuum; these problems are intertwined with problems of the
breadth of the territorial sea, external delimitation of the Continental
Shelf and the governance of the seabeds and water columns beyond
national jurisdiction which are all areas of intense international con-
cern. 4 6 Even more significant as an argument against state regulation is
the contention that real success in the conservation and exploitation of
fishing resources everywhere in the world can ultimately be achieved
only through international regulation, and that unilateral action is
therefore harmful in the long run.4 7
The court's finding that the problem at hand did not demand a
uniform solution so as to exclude state action faced still another
" The basis of the court's conclusion regarding federal exclusivity relies primarily
on Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), where the Court found
that the commerce clause confers on the national government authority concurrent
with the states over matters of interstate and foreign commerce, and even in the
absence of federal legislation, prohibits regulation in areas of commerce that are na-
tional in nature. Therefore, once finding that the commerce sought to be regulated is
local in nature, the court avoids the prohibitory force of the commerce clause on state
authority.
Difficulties arise, however, since few aspects of commerce are inherently either
wholly national or local in nature. Consequently, a court may be left with recon-
ciliating conflicting claims of state and national power over certain areas of commerce.
41 In large part, prior to and during the Bundrant decision, the Federal Govern-
ment had chosen not to regulate fishery resources in the seas adjacent to the coastal
states. However, since enactment of the FCMA, there seems little question now that
the United States has reversed its passive position and asserted jurisdiction over ex-
traterritorial fisheries and under certain circumstances even within the three-mile ter-
ritorial zone. FCMA, § 306, 16 U.S.C. § 1856 (1976).
46 The underlying rationale for an exclusive federal power over extraterritorial
waters is based upon the perception that the potential adoptions of separate foreign
policies by the states would be inimical to an effective federal foreign policy. Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See also CLINGAN, A Second Look at United States
Fisheries Management, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 432 (1972).
41 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 490, 496 (1971).
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theoretical hurdle. It was alleged that the state's exercise of extra-
territorial regulatory powers carried with it adverse affects upon in-
terstate and foreign commerce. Since fishery resources move from the
waters of one state to another and from national to international
waters and the exploitation, distribution, and marketing of such
resources ordinarily involve movement among the states, significant
adverse affects to neighboring coastal states and foreign fishing fleets
would result in restricting catches beyond the three-mile limit. The
court's justification for the attendant affects rested on a questionable
"residuum of state power theory" which was established by dictum in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona." In Southern Pacfic, the Court
stated that "there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws
governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure
affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it. ... 49
Bolstering its position, the Bundrant majority further found that the
48 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
41 Id. at 767. Littoral states like Alaska unquestionably have a high interest in
protecting the quality and quantity of their fishery resources. The weight accorded a
state's interest in protecting fishery resources is illustrated by the modem standard for
evaluating local health regulations. Unless "the total effect of a law as a safety measure
• ..is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping in-
terstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it," the statute will
be upheld. 325 U.S. at 775-76.
The Court's standard of review, however, is in fact more scrutinizing than this
language suggests. Under this standard, two types of legislation, closely analogous to
the emergency regulations in the Bundrant decision, have been invalidated as inconsis-
tent with the commerce clause policy of free trade.
In the first type, a state attempted to allocate natural resources to the use of
state citizens in preference to citizens of other states. Specifically, the statute required
all local demand for natural gas to be met before gas could be exported. The Supreme
Court, in reviewing the statute, expressed a deep concern that retaliatory efforts be-
tween states might arise with commerce halting at state lines. The Court spoke in
terms of a "new power appearing and a new welfare which transcends that of any
state" where local regulations may inhibit the free flow of commerce among the states.
Pa. v. W. Va., 262 U.S. 553, 599-600 (1923), quoting from West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911). The rationale of these cases was recently reaffirm-
ed in Hughes v. Alexander Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
A second type of invalidating technique employed by the Supreme Court arises
where a state has available a less restrictive alternative than the one chosen. In Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), the Court struck down a Wisconsin or-
dinance regulating milk pasteurization. The Court stated that "even in the exercise of
its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people" the state must
use whatever reasonable and adequate alternatives are available to achieve its ends. Id.
at 354.
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Board's regulations would neither discriminate against non-Alaskans
nor provoke retaliatory restrictions by Alaska's neighboring states.5s
The court also reached the position that the possible ramifications of
the challenged regulations in the field of international commerce ap-
peared extremely speculative. And, moreover, the threat of conflict
with existing international agreements or foreign fishing rights was
remote."' Accordingly, the court concluded that the challenged regula-
tions dealt with a problem local in nature and that the dormant Com-
merce Clause did not render regulation of fisheries in the Bering Sea
within the exclusive domain of the Federal Government. 52
Applying these two circumstances to the state action condoned in Bundrant, it is
possible to conclude that the Board's regulations would be found unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court. Indeed, Alaska's attempt to prohibit extraterritorial crabbing in
the Bering Sea in the name of fishery conservation and management may be a more
serious interference with interstate and foreign commerce than is necessary.
The primary concern of Justice Connor's dissenting opinion in Bundrant was that
extraterritorial fishery regulations were "inextricably entwined with foreign affairs" and
thereby within federal regulatory authority. 546 P.2d at 563-64 (dissenting opinion).
Despite the above analysis, it could also be argued that the Bundrant court need
not balance interests in the context of environmental protection because the interest in
the environment is so powerful that it outweighs any conceivable burden on com-
merce. This argument can be bolstered by the fact that the Supreme Court's over-
riding concern in the commerce clause cases has been the prevention of state
discrimination against nonresidents. See Soper, The Constitutional Framework of En-
vironmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 20, 94 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert
eds. 1974).
10 State legislation that applies to residents and nonresidents alike poses a lesser
threat to commerce clause policies, and as a result greater weight can be given to in-
terests identified by a state as pressing.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has always employed a balancing test where
transportation in interstate commerce is involved, as opposed to environmental regula-
tions. At issue in commerce clause cases is whether a particular problem demands a
uniform solution, and where Congress has failed to indicate a preference the function
falls to the courts. Southern Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
1 546 P.2d at 540. The dissenting opinion found this conclusion untenable.
Pointing to numerous treaties in which the United States is a signatory and dealing
with ownership and regulatory authority over resources of the Continental Shelf and
deep seabed, Justice Connor could not conclude that Alaska's actions were
"speculative" or "indirect." Additionally, Alaska's extraterritorial regulatory assertion
could cause definite embarassment to the United States international negotiations at
the Law of the Sea Conference. Id. at 562 (dissenting opinion).
11 546 P.2d at 541. Support for this conclusion was derived from Alas. v. Arctic
Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961). In that decision the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of an Alaskan occupation tax on freezer ships stationed beyond territorial seas
but receiving catches taken within the three-mile limit. The Bundrant court relied on
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Before leaving the issue of federal exclusivity, the court addressed
appellees' argument based on the submerged land cases.5 3 As seen
earlier, the Supreme Court in United States v. California,54 held inter
alia, that the Federal Government had paramount authority over the
seas and submerged lands on both sides of the traditional three-mile
territorial limit.5 5 However, the submerged land cases have been read
by subsequent courts as not establishing the principle that the Federal
Government has exclusive authority in these areas, and in the absence
of an exercise of the Federal Government's paramount powers over
Arctic Maid to show that the regulation was a local activity which the state could prop-
erly reach. However, as pointed out in the dissent, the court's reliance on Arctic
Maid may have been misplaced. The Arctic Maid decision can be read as not
authorizing Alaska to tax activity outside the three-mile limit. Instead, the opinion ex-
pressly stated that if the fish caught "were taken or purchased outside Alaska's ter-
ritorial waters all of respondent's business . . . would be beyond Alaska's reach." 366
U.S. at 203. Following a remand to determine this precise question of what quantity of
the catch was obtained outside Alaska's territorial waters, the case was settled.
13 The "submerged land cases" are confusing and complex. They most accurately
represent that overlapping area of the doctrines of federal exclusivity and preemption
as pointed out by Professor Gunther. See note 33 supra. Many of the cases in this area
are subject to varied interpretations and constructions. For a good analysis of the
"submerged land cases" see Breeden, Federalism and the Development of the Outer
Continental Shelf Mineral Resources, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1976).
54 332 U.S. 19 (1947). In this case, it was held that the Federal Government and
not the State of California owned the three-mile marginal belt off its coastline, and
that incidental to the Federal Government's ownership was dominion over the natural
resources found in the submerged lands. The Court commented that federal control of
the three-mile belt was essential to national security, foreign affairs and international
commerce. Id. at 35.
As to the seas beyond the three-mile limit, United States v. La., 339 U.S. 699
(1950), declared that the rights of the Federal Government were paramount to asserted
claims by the individual states. This decision involved a complaint by the United States
that it had exclusive ownership and rights in the submerged lands in an area extending
from the low water mark on the Louisiana coastline to a point extending 27 miles into
the Gulf of Mexico. The Federal Government sought to enjoin Louisiana from ex-
ecuting leases to persons and corporations for the purpose of oil drilling as well as ex-
traction of other mineral resources from the seabeds. Additionally, the United States
sought an accounting from Louisiana for rents and other financial benefits received
therefrom. The Court upheld the claim and rendered the requested relief. The
California decision was cited as precedent controlling the case. The Court reasoned
that since the California decision established the principle that the Federal Government
had ownership and control of the three-mile belt, it was to be presumed that any area
beyond this point would also be owned by the Federal Government. 339 U.S. at 705.
11 332 U.S. at 35.
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fishery areas, states enjoy some regulatory authority. 6 Thus, the ques-
tion of whether the Federal Government has in fact exercised those
paramount powers, thereby preempting state authority to regulate
fisheries, became the court's next consideration.
The doctrine of federal preemption presented the justices of the
Bundrant court their greatest cause for concern. Federal legislation
that cuts across domestic and international fronts bars inconsistent
state regulation. Oftentimes, the difficulty faced in the preemption
area is determining to what extent Congress has entered into a field,
and if such entry has sufficiently covered the subject matter so as to
render ineffectual state authority over the same subject.5 7
In response to the Court's declaration in California that the seabed
within the three-mile territorial limit was owned by the Federal
Government, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) of
1953.8 This legislation granted to the states ownership of the seabed
and its resources seaward to a three-mile limit.59 However, the SLA
can be said to be consistent with the California decision to the extent
that the Federal Government's paramount powers still remain intact
16 546 P.2d at 544. For example, in Tex. v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), the
Supreme Court ruled that state regulation within territorial waters in the absence of
conflicting federal legislation was valid so long as the means were constitutionally per-
missible. So too, in Skiriotes v. Fla. 313 U.S. 69 (1941), the Court made clear that a
state may regulate activities of its own citizens even beyond territorial waters when the
state has a legitimate interest in the fishery and there is no conflicting federal law.
11 Federal preemption of state authority may take on numerous forms. Clearly,
Congress may pass a law or ratify a treaty pursuant to an enumerated constitutional
power which expressly displaces state law through the supremacy clause. It is also
possible for a court to conclude that the power alleged to exist by the state is impliedly
within a federal scheme of fishery regulation. Moreover, federal preemption is a
preferred ground of invalidation because a court is not declaring state law incompati-
ble with the constitution, but rather only labelling it inconsistent with congressional
policy on the same subject matter. As a result, the power of the state to regulate has
not been destroyed but only denied in a particular instance. See G. GUNTHER, supra
note 32, at 357-60.
" 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1976). See note 5 supra. Many legal scholars, in-
cluding the majority in Bundrant, hold that the SLA implicitly overruled the holding
in California. However, the SLA did not affect rights beyond the three-mile limit.
Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the rationale of the California and Louisiana
decisions is still valid as applied to areas seaward of the territorial marginal belt.
19 It has been argued that the the SLA implicitly placed a limit on states ter-
ritorial water rights to the three-mile limit off their respective coastlines and futher,
the SLA made no provision for the extension of state boundaries beyond this point.
See 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 170, 178 (1972).
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over this area for purposes of navigation, commerce, national defense
and international affairs.60
Shortly after the enactment of the SLA, Congress passed the
OCSLA 6s to deal with the submerged lands lying beyond the three-
mile limit. The OCSLA specifically vested the Federal Government
with control over the submerged lands lying beyond the three-mile
limit. 62 The jurisdiction asserted by the OCSLA was later confirmed by
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,6 3 which recognized
coastal nations' sovereignty over the seabed of the Continental Shelf in
1958.
As a result of the OCSLA and the 1958 Geneva Convention, the
Continental Shelf lands off American waters became the territory of
the United States. 64 Thus, the enormous tracts of submerged lands
beyond state territorial properties were consequently within national
60 The SLA specifically states that:
[T]he United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and
powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the
constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and inter-
national affairs, all of which shall be paramount to but shall not be deemed
to include proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of . . . leasing, use,
and development of the lands and natural resources . . .vested in and assign-
ed to the respective states. . . .43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1976).
61 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1976).
The OSCLA broadly states that:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and seabed
of the Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition. . . .Id. § 1331(a).
The term "outer Continental Shelf' was defined as all submerged lands under
American jurisdiction which lie seaward of the areas granted to the states under the
SLA. Id.
Although this language may be broad in nature, the majority in Bundrant inter-
preted the OCSLA as expressing Congress' desire to involve the Federal Government in
the practice of offshore oil leasing arrangements with major oil companies and thereby
not dealing with the regulation of living ocean resources. 546 P.2d at 543. See also
Rathje, Saving Byron's Sea: Federal and State Regulation of Oil Pollution from Ocean
Petroleum Production, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 485 (1971).
63 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471 (pt. 1),
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
64 Although the international law of the sea is currently undergoing reappraisal
in light of technological changes, environmental problems and newly developed uses
for the seas, the United States has unilaterally affected the extent of federal offshore
lands and has directly affected the division of federal and state jurisdiction over off-
shore lands as a result of the FCMA.
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jurisdiction and owned outright by the Federal Government.6 ' Accord-
ingly, the Bundrant appellees' argued that the logic underlying the
OCSLA and relevant Supreme Court decisions applied with equal
force to use of the surface and waters for fishing purposes as to the use
of seabed and subsoil for mineral extraction; in both instances, ex-
traterritorial regulation by the State of Alaska would conflict with
federal laws and policies, and would therefore be preempted through
the Supremacy Clause.6 6 The majority's rejection of this position was
grounded on the express language of the OCSLS. Preempted was state
regulation of the "seabed and subsoil" while permissible state regula-
tion of water-borne ocean resources was not specifically addressed by
65 See United States v. Me., 420 U.S. 515 (1975). In Maine, several Atlantic
coast states claimed sovereignty rights over the subsoil and seabed to the outer edge of
the Continental Shelf. Except for Florida and New York, all of the defendant states
contended that they each had title to the areas by virtue of succeeding to the title
formerly held by England before the adoption of the United States Constitution. Id. at
518-19. The Court rejected these claims and affirmed a special master's findings that
the California and Louisiana decisions were controlling and that as a matter of "purely
legal principle . . . the Constitution . . . allotted to the federal government jurisdiction
over foreign commerce, foreign affairs and national defense," and that "it necessarily
follows that, as a matter of constitutional law, that . . . the federal government has
paramount rights in the marginal sea." Id. at 552.
Moreover, Congress explicitly forbade state regulatory jurisdiction over the
federal outer Continental Shelf properties by providing in the OCSLA that federal laws
would apply "as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive federal
jurisdiction located within a state." 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1976). Relying on this and
similar language from the OCSLA, Mr. Justice Connor's dissent in Bundrant ar-
ticulated the position that the Federal Government should be vested with authority
and control over outer Continental Shelf areas and not the individual states. Justice
Connor pointed to floor debates during the consideration of the OCSLA and cited
remarks made by Senator Cordon, the floor manager of the OCSLA:
[T]he area is one in which national problems intermingle. The outer Con-
tinental Shelf is not and never has been within the boundary of any State or
Territory, and it is, therefore, uniquely an area of exclusive Federal jurisdic-
tion and control .... [T]o give the states a sort of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over it is unnecessary and undesirable. Particularly in view of the inter-
mingling of national and international rights in the area, it is important that
the Federal Government, which has the responsibility for handling foreign
relations, have the exclusive control of lawmaking and law enforcement
there.
546 P.2d at 559-60, citing from 99 CONG. REC. 6963 (1953) (remarks of Sen. Corden).
66 Alternatively, such regulation by the State of Alaska would conflict with
federal activities in areas of national defense, foreign affairs, and international com-
merce. See note 64 supra.
Vol. 10:703
FCMA: ACCOMMODATION OF INTERESTS
the OCSLA. s7 Also rejected was appellees' contention that since the
SLA refers to and provides a definition of "natural resources" which
explicitly includes crabs, that definition should be viewed as evidence
of Congressional intent to include crabs within the terms of the later
enacted OCSLA.6 The court, however, refused to accept the wholesale
adoption of the statutory construction principle of pari materia which
suggests that a statute which was considered at approximately the same
time and which dealt with the same general question but passed subse-
quent to another can be interpreted in light of the earlier enacted
measure. Instead, the majority construed the OCSLA as providing that
no state shall have jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil of the outer
Continental Shelf, and the natural resources thereof.69 "Thereof' was
read as modifying the OCSLA's scope to the natural resources which
are part and parcel of the outer Continental Shelf.70 In the end, the
court was faced with a new issue-whether crabs are a resource of the
seabed and subsoil or a resource of the superadjacent waters.
Appellees' new line of attack emphasized the fact that federal
legislation and international agreements subsequent to the passage of
the OCSLA evidenced congressional intent to include sedentary species
of marine life, i.e., crabs, among the resources of the seabed and sub-
soil thereby vesting the Federal Government with preemptive authority.
It was further shown that the 1958 Geneva Convention established
sedentary species as resources of the Continental Shelf thereby granting
coastal nations sovereign rights of exploitation over these species. 7
Crabs were specifically intended to be included within the category of
67 Although the Maine decision specifically related to claims to the subsoil and
seabed, the Court reinterpreted California as establishing "that in our constitutional
system paramount rights over the ocean waters and their seabed were vested in the
Federal Government." 420 U.S. 515, 520 (1975) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, Justice Erwin of the majority in Bundrant opined that this language
may be taken as an indication that the Court did not consciously draw a distinction
between seabed and seawaters, but rather applied its rationale to only the former. 546
P.2d at 543.
68 546 P.2d at 545.
69 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
10 546 P.2d at 545.
11 Art. 2.4 of the Convention provides that the natural resources appertaining to
nations shall include "living organisms belonging to sedentary species ... organisms
which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile or under the seabed or are unable
to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil." Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 25 U.S.T. 471 (pt. 1), T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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sedentary species by a 1973 Agreement between the United States and
the Soviet Union. 72 The Agreement listed king and tanner crabs as
natural resources of the Continental Shelf and under the control of the
respective signatories. Nevertheless, the majority in Bundrant found
these documents unimpressive. The court stated that since the 1958
Geneva Convention was drafted by parties other than Congress and
failed to effectively resolve the domestic jurisdictional question as be-
tween the United States and the individual states that it was not con-
trolling.7s
The Bartlett Act7 4 which was passed eleven years after the OCSLA
and provided the means by which the United States was able to en-
force against foreign nationals the rights obtained pursuant to the 1958
Geneva Convention was next cited to the court. The argument made
was that since the Bartlett Act applied to the policing of sedentary
species, including crabs, pursuant to the Geneva Convention or other
international agreements where the United States was a party, that the
Federal Government was the only proper authority to regulate the area
beyond the three-mile limit.7" The Bundrant court found this enforce-
ment legislation irrelevant to the immediate issue presented in the
case. The contention that Congress had intended to realign domestic
jurisdiction through the Bartlett Act so as to preempt further state
regulation of sedentary Shelf marine life was too tenuous in the eyes of
the majority.76 Therefore, it was concluded that the OCSLA was not
72 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republic Relating to Fishing for King
Crab, 16 U.S.T. 24, T.I.A.S. No. 5752. See also Agreement Relating to Fishing for
King and Tanner Crab, 24 U.S.T. 603, T.I.A.S. No. 7571 (extended Dec. 31, 1974).
11 546 P.2d at 546. Furthermore, since the Board's regulations were not to be en-
forced against foreign nationals, the court felt that the King and Tanner crab
agreements with the Soviet Union were not relevant to the decision. Id. at 542.
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (1976).
" As of March 1, 1977, the Bartlett Act was repealed by the FCMA. The FCMA
provides its own mechanism for renegotiating governing international fishery
agreements. For a comparison of the enforcement efforts under the Bartlett Act and
those contemplated for the FCMA see Fidell, Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976: The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REV. 513 (1977).
16 546 P.2d at 546. On the other hand, Justice Connor, in his dissenting opinion
deemed interpretation of the'OCSLA in the context of international law to be highly
relevant, if not conclusive, to the preemptive effect of federal authority on state action
beyond the three-mile marginal sea. Judge Connor accused the majority of incon-
sistently construing the OCSLA. "It does not seem likely that the same language, in-
deed the same sections, could have a different meaning in international law from its
meaning for preemptive purposes." Id. at 560 (dissenting opinion).
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intended to be an exercise of federal preemption over both seabed
mineral resources and sedentary species of the Continental Shelf. The
distinction drawn by the OCSLA was between the inorganic resources
of the seabed and subsoil, which were to be within the exclusive do-
main of the Federal Government and organic marine life resources,
which were not affected by the OCSLA.7 7
Next, the majority pointed to the then-pending congressional pro-
posals authorizing federal agencies to regulate activities of American
citizens in ocean fisheries. In the view of the majority, such proposals
suggested that the OCSLA never had the preemptive effect which was
ascribed to it by the appellees. Further, the proposals lacked a clear
intention of federal exclusivity or preemption.7" The court did, never-
theless, note that its decision raised issues with merit on both sides and
expressed a hope that final resolution of the general question as to
what extent a state may regulate fisheries beyond territorial waters
receive "prompt and definitive" attention by the Congress or the
Supreme Court.79
Thus, after finding that the federal doctrines of exclusivity and
preemption were not applicable and that therefore the Board's prom-
ulgations were not invalidated under the Supremacy Clause, the
court had little trouble justifying Alaska's interest for extraterritorially
applying its laws and police powers. The majority concluded that
Alaska could reasonably extend its jurisdiction to control fish and
game resources outside the limited area of the state's territorial
Moreover, Connor found that in order to vest the greatest rights in the United
States against foreign governments, the provisions of the OCSLA had to be interpreted
broadly in light of subsequent developments. Id. Accordingly, he found that nothing
in the OCSLA was inconsistent with the interpretation that crabs are a resource of the
Continental Shelf, and therefore appertain to the United States as against foreign and
state governments. See United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970) (extrater-
ritorial coral found to be a sedentary species of the Continental Shelf appertaining to
the United States as against foreign and state governments.)
11 But see United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
18 The dissent's discussion of Congress' fishery regulation and territorial extension
proposals was within the context of international law. Originating from the rationale
of the California decision, the dissent maintained that the whole area of ocean-floor
resources regulation was inextricably entwined with international law and world af-
fairs. As a result, Alaska's extension of territorial regulatory authority would be by
necessity in conflict with the United States attempts to achieve a global solution to the
question of national extent and control over ocean resources. 546 P.2d at 562 (dissen-
ting opinion).
19 Id. at 548.
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sovereignty so long as the exercise was based on conservation principles
and not on artificial boundaries or political pressures.80 On the basis of
this reasoning, the court held that the difference in citizen status be-
tween each appellee did not affect its judicial power to confer in per-
sonam jurisdiction. Consequently, jurisdiction was asserted over each
appellee regardless of state citizenship and without concern over whether
their activities took place within the three-mile limit or beyond. 81
C. FCMA Provisions: Function and Impact
The practical effects of the Bundrant decision are that crabbers
who wish to fish off the Alaska coast will be subjected to preordained
quotas established by the State Fish and Game Board, and in some in-
stances fishery areas will be closed completely to crabbing. Theoretically,
the case illustrates the overall inconsistency that existed prior to the
passage of the FCMA in the area of extraterritorial fishery jurisdiction
between the Federal Government and the individual states. So long as
"O Id. The issue of the state's fishery jurisdiction was whether the regulations bore
a reasonable relationship to the purpose sought to be achieved. On the basis of
Skiriotes v., Fla., 313 U.S. 69 (1941), the Bundrant majority concluded that the State
of Alaska could regulate the activities of the defendants even though such activity was
beyond territorial borders since legitimate state interests were affected and the claim of
state authority did not infringe the rights of other governments nor was it in conflict
with congressional legislation.
In Skiriotes, a Florida statute prohibited the use of diving apparatus in the taking
of commercial sponges. The defendant, a Florida citizen, was convicted under this
statute, and contended that because his activities occurred outside Florida's territorial
waters Florida could not constitutionally regulate those activities. Even though the
Supreme court did assess Florida's undersea rights, it nevertheless held that Florida
could constitutionally apply its law to the defendant's activities. The Court stated that
"the question is solely between appellant and his own state .... [W]e see no reason
why the State of Florida may not . . . govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high
seas with respect to matters in which the state has a legitimate interest and where
there is no conflict with acts of Congress." Id. at 76-77.
Thus, three conditions were necessary before a state court could enforce extrater-
ritorial regulations against a named defendant-that the defendant be a citizen of the
state enforcing the regulations, that the alleged activities affect legitimate state in-
terests and that the rights of other governments not be infringed upon. It may be
argued however, that two of these conditions-that the defendant(s) be a citizen of the
regulating state and that the rights of other (foreign) governments not be infringed
upon-are lacking in the Bundrant decision.
" See note 80 supra. The dissent did not address the question of state jurisdic-
tion since Justice Connor found federal preemption of the state's extraterritorial
regulatory authority. 546 P.2d at 564 (dissenting opinion).
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a court could identify a compelling state interest which was sought to
be protected there was ample room within the federal statutory law
and case decisions to avoid federal exclusion and preemption. On the
whole, resolutions to conflicts in fishery matters were varied in scope,
exceedingly technical and ultimately political in nature. Moreover, in-
dividual states were able to intrude into areas previously thought to be
beyond their territorial reach. The movement into zones of foreign
commerce and international affairs was done under the guise of state
conservation and management objectives. As a result, state fishery
regions have become greater in breadth, more commonplace among
American coastal states, and breeders of theoretical confusion and dis-
sent between state and federal fishery authorities.
With the passage of the FCMA, Congress affirmatively entered into
the field of extraterritorial fishery jurisdiction and assembled statutory
machinery working to preserve the Federal Government's paramount
rights to navigation, commerce, defense, and foreign affairs, while at
the same time providing for a national regulatory authority aimed at
accommodating state, federal, and international interests. Also under
the regime of the management authority of the FCMA, fishermen
governed by the ultimate regulations have a voice in their drafting
which was entirely absent from the Bundrant case.
As mentioned previously, Congress has declared that its purpose
under the FCMA is to create "a fishery conservation zone within which
the United States will assume exclusive fishery management authority
over all fish except highly migratory species." 82 This "fishery conserva-
tion zone" is to have an outer boundary 200 miles from shore. In addi-
tion, the FCMA asserts the claim to exclusive fishery management
authority over all United States anadromous species having their source
within the United States"3 and "throughout the migratory range of
each such species beyond the fishery conservation zone," except when
harvested in foreign waters.8 4 Continental Shelf fishery resources are
claimed under the exclusive authority beyond 200 miles.85
82 FCMA, § 2(b)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976) (emphasis added). Such author-
ity is created for anadromous and Continental Shelf species as well. Id. § 2(b)(1)(B),
16 U.S.C. § 1801.
"3 See note 91 infra. This applies essentially to salmon. Anadromous species are
defined as "species of fish which spawn in fresh or estuarine waters of the United
States and which migrate to ocean waters." FCMA, § 3(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (1976).
84 Id. § 102, 16 U.S.C. § 1812.
a Upon signing the FCMA into law, President Ford expressed deep concern as to
whether the United States could properly control fishery resources outside the fishery
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Although the express purposes of the FCMA constitute a wide-
ranging extension of territorial water jurisdiction to a point 200
nautical miles from the American shoreline, there are recognizable
limits. There is a disclaimer of any jurisdictional expansion not ex-
pressly provided for in the FCMA.86 Thus, it is important to keep in
mind that the asserted rights and powers under the FCMA deal only
with living resources and not with offshore mineral exploitation.
Moreover, a limit to the geographical extent Of Continental Shelf
fishery resources 7 is provided by defining the term Continental Shelf
closely analogous to the language of the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf. As such, the FCMA may be categorized as a
separate unit of the economic zone concept since it applies only to
enumerated fishery resources within the contiguous fishing zone. s8
Within this statutory framework the legislative objective was to
establish a national fishery management program which is to be im-
plemented primarily through eight Regional Fishery Management
Councils. s8
conservation zone under accepted principles of international law. 12 PRES. DOC. 664
(1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 634 (1976).
16 FCMA, § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976) states:
It is further declared to be the policy of the Congress in this chapter to main-
tain without change the existing territorial or other ocean jurisdiction of the
United States for all purposes other than the conservation and management
of fishery resources, as provided for in this chapter ...
0' The term "Continental Shelf fishery resources" is defined by listing known
species of colenterata, crustacea, mollusks and sponges, and providing criteria for
future additions to this otherwise exclusive list. Id. § 3(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1802. A limit to
the geographical extent of "Continental Shelf fishery resources" is provided by defining
"Continental Shelf' as follows:
The term "Continental Shelf' means the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, of the
United States, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of such areas.
Id. § 3(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1802.
88 Subchapter I of the FCMA which sets forth the scope of the fishery manage-
ment authority of the United States defines the contiguous fishing zone as follows:
[A] zone contiguous to the territorial sea . . .The inner boundary of the
fishery conservation zone is a line coterminous with the seward boundary of
each of the coastal states, and the outer boundary of such zone is a line
drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.
Id. § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1811.
19 Id. § 302(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1852. The regional council in which Alaska is a
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Each council is responsible for deriving the fishery policy and ob-
jectives for a particular region. Just as with the traditional approach to
coastal fishery jurisdiction, the FCMA requires the regional councils to
balance local interests against the national standards necessary to
satisfy the needs of the economy (domestic and international) before
developing a regional fishery plan. The discussion now focuses upon
the specific guidelines envisioned for the conservation and manage-
ment regime under the FCMA and the accommodations made
available for the interests and needs of the individual states. 90
The FCMA makes it very clear that the United States will exercise
exclusive management authority within the contiguous fishery zone and
subject anadromous and Continental Shelf species to such authority as
well. 9 ' Among the defined Continental Shelf fishery resources are
sedentary species which accounted for the class of crabs subject to
regulation in Bundrant.9 2 Accordingly, under the FCMA these
resources are within the jurisdiction of and subject to the control of
the national fishery management authority. 9 Under the national
fishery management authority there are created smaller, local-interest-
oriented regional councils. Each council reflects in its membership the
interests of the constituent states. The primary function of the regional
councils is to prepare, monitor and revise fishery management plans
for delineated fishery areas. 94 The councils comment on applications
for foreign fishing rights within the contiguous fishery zone of the
United States. They also critique management plans and amendments
prepared by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to a provision
authorizing discretionary powers when a council's actions fail to satisfy
member is the North Pacific Council which is comprised of 11 voting members from
the states of Alaska, Washington and Oregon. See note 125 infra.
" For an analysis of the FCMA's constitutionality based upon Congress' power to
control foreign commerce or its foreign affairs power in matters of international con-
cern see Note, 52 WASH. L. REV. 495 (1977).
0' See note 83 supra. The only exception to this control is when the anadromous
species are found within any recognized nation's territorial sea or fishery conservation
zone. For a brief discussion of the doubtful validity of such control over anadromous
species seaward of the contiguous fishing zone see Comment, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 331,
351 (1977).
92 546 P.2d at 545-46.
93 For purposes of the FCMA, sedentary species include coral, crab, lobster,
clams, abalone and sponges found on the Continental Shelf beyond the 200 mile
fishery conservation zone. FCMA, §§ 3(4), 102(3), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1812 (1976).
91 Id. § 302(h)(i),(5), 16 U.S.C. § 1852.
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the FCMA's requirements or the Secretary's recommendations.9 5
Fishery management plans are required to contain a complete descrip-
tion of the fishery to be regulated, detailing, inter alia, the fishing ef-
fort, the projected expenditures for the management, expected
revenues from the fishery and the recreational and Indian treaty in-
terests currently involved. 96 The FCMA specifically directs each council
to continually review and revise their assessments on the basis of two
overall objectives: optimum yield and total allowable level of foreign
fishing. As a function of reaching the optimum yield 97 projection,
councils must estimate and specify the present and future conditions of
the fishery, the capacity and extent to which American vessels will
harvest the optimum yield," and the portion of the optimum yield
that will not be harvested and thus, can be made available for foreign
fishing. 99 If there is a portion of the optimum yield that can be al-
lotted to foreign fishing then mangement plans are required to outline
measures determined to be necessary and appropriate for application
of the plan to foreign nations. 0 0 In arriving at management deter-
minations, councils must conduct public hearings,10' make reports to
91 Id. § 303(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1854. See id. § 204(b)(4)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 1824, for a
council's enumerated duties concerning application for foreign fishing privileges.
96 Id. § 303(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1853.
91 Id. § 303(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1853. The FCMA defines the optimum yield from
a fishery as:
the amount of fish -
(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with
particular reference to food production and recreational opportunities;
and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sus-
tainable yeild from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic,
social or ecological factor.
Id. § 3(18), 16 U.S.C. § 1802. See Alverson, The Role of Conservation and Fishery
Science under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L.
REv. 723 (1977), for an interesting analysis of the impact of the FCMA upon tradi-
tional fishery management practices.
98 FCMA, § 303(a)(4)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1853 (1976).
99 Id. § 303(a)(4)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1853. The Secretary of State, in conjunction
with the Secretary of Commerce, will determine the allocation among foreign nations
of that portion of the total allowable catch which cannot be harvested by United States
fishermen.
100 Id. § 303(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1853. This provision may also apply to
domestic fishing as well.
101 Regional public hearings are to be conducted "so as to allow all interested per-
sons an opportunity to be heard in the development of fishery management plans and
amendments to such plans and with respect to the administration and implementation
of the provisions of this chapter." Id. § 302(h)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1852.
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the Secretary of Commerce,10 2 and perform any other activities that
are required, authorized or appropriate.'0 3
Although the FCMA imposes numerous requirements upon the
regional councils and their development of fishery management plans,
it also provides for certain discretionary measures to be vested with the
councils. 0 4 Included in this category is authority to impose permit and
fee requirements, to establish catch quotas, and to limit entry in
designated zones on the basis of types of fishery vessels or types and
quantities of fishing gear. Incorporation of relevent fishery conserva-
tion and management measures of nearby states is also allowable.' 05
Councils are also at liberty to establish a system for limiting access to a
particular fishery area so as to achieve optimum yield forecasts.
However, in order for the prohibition to be effective, the council and
Secretary need to take into account present and historical dependence
on the resource area, the economics of the fishery, the capability of
vessels therein to engage themselves elsewhere, the cultural and social
framework relating to the fishery and any other relevant
consideration.' 0 6 Thus, it might be said that through a framework
characterized by mandatory requirements and discretionary abilities of
the councils, the FCMA achieves a management authority with a
statutory sensitivity07 toward accommodating regional (local), national
and foreign interests.
After a fishery management plan is prepared by a regional council,
it is submitted to the Secreatary of Commerce, who initially reviews the
plan,'0 8 and notifies the respective council of his decision to approve,
disapprove or partially modify the submitted plan.' 0 9 Once a plan has
been approved or prepared (partially or totally) by the Secretary, he
must publish the plan and any accompanying amendments or regula-
tions in the Federal Register."0 Normally, plans, amendments and
regulations will not be implemented for at least forty-five days after
102 Id. § 302(h)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1852.
--- Id. § 302(h)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1852.
104 Id. § 303(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1853.
10 Id. § 303(b)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 1853.
-0- Id. § 303(b)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1853.
107 This statutory sensitivity is at its height where the conditions of optimum yield
and allowable foreign quotas are met.
108 FCMA, § 304(a),(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1854 (1976).
010 Id. § 304(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1854.
110 Id. § 305(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1855. Note that § 304(c)(3) requires that the
plan/system first be approved by a majority of the voting members of each council.
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being approved or prepared by the Secretary. In the meantime, in-
terested parties are entitled and encouraged to submit written com-
ments on the plan,' with the Secretary reserving the right to schedule
a hearing." 2 If such a hearing is convened, the Secretary has discre-
tionary powers to delay the effective date of the proposed plan or
regulations or to take such other actions as -he deems appropriate to
maintain the rights of any person.1 3 The Secretary is, nevertheless, ac-
corded emergency powers to promulgate regulations or amendments to
regulations without regard to procedures operative in normal situa-
tions." 4 Emergency regulations may not remain in effect for longer
than forty-five days unless the Secretary exercises the right to extend
for an additional forty-five day period.'
The United States Coast Guard is given enforcement powers to
police any licensing arrangements, to enforce catch limits and gear
restrictions and to apprehend any violators, whether domestic or
foreign. "16
At the outset, it would appear that a regional council might be
able to effectively develop a self-serving fishery plan since its range of
discretionary powers appears virtually limitless. 1'7 However, congres-
sional framers placed a gloss on the discretionary powers of councils by
subjecting these powers to conformity with national standards. The
standard of review under the FCMA is based upon whether a par-
ticular plan is consistent with national standards, the other provisions
of the FCMA and "any other applicable law.""' Although the exten-
sion of the conformity requirement to "any other applicable law" may
fuel future litigation," 9 the congressional intent is clear that regional
"1 Id.
12 Id. § 305(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1855.
11 Id.
Id. § 305(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1855. The congressional intent, however, appears to
be that these short-lived emergency powers should not be allowed to frustrate the
overall framework of § 304, providing for special actions taken by the Secretary after
receipt of a fishery plan.
I's Id.
Id. § 311, 16 U.S.C. § 1861.
'" Under a council's discretionary powers to set catch quotas and effectively close
areas, it would appear that the same result could easily be reached as that in Bun-
drant. See text and accompanying notes 103-06 supra.
"' FCMA, § 303(a)(1)(C), 16 U.S.C. § 1853 (1976).
119 Such a clause may lead one right back to the Bundrant type of analysis since
states are apt to be favorable toward extending their fisheries jurisdiction while the
Secretary will have a host of federal statutes to rely upon to indicate paramount in-
terest vested within the Federal Government.
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councils will be expected to weigh national interests heavily before arriv-
ing at an acceptable fishery plan. The statutory effect of this conform-
ity requirement is to curtail the overall ability of incorporating discre-
tionary state management measures on the part of a council or the
Secretary. 12 0
In the last analysis, the primary purpose of the national fishery
management program is to establish national standards by which
regional councils can prevent overfishing and achieve optimum yields
on a continuing basis. Furthermore, recognition of local fishery needs
and interests is manifested by the regional based councils. Through
this framework the FCMA attempts to strike on equitable balance bet-
ween state, national, and international fishery needs.
While it is entirely possible that the result which was reached in
Bundrant might well have been accomplished under the FCMA,121 it is
more important to recognize the effect that the FCMA will have on a
coastal state's ability in the future to unilaterally legislate in the area
of fishery resources. Clearly, the doctrines of federal exclusivity and
preemption will play a much more prominent role in a court's deter-
mination of whether the Federal Government has entered the field of
extraterritorial fishery regulation. Moreover, international relations
have been brought to the forefront as a result of the FCMA's applica-
tion to foreign fishing agreements and this coupled with the revived
LOS III negotiations may foreclose future state intrusion into the
area. 1 22 Thus, state authority to regulate extraterritorial fishery areas
120 Section 303(b)(5) repeats parenthetically the federal consistency requirement,
thus crippling the overall breadth of the discretionary incorporation powers. This ques-
tion of state fishery regulation within and without its borders is addressed in § 306(a).
Moreover, the federal jurisdictional exception of § 306(b) which would permit federal
authority to be directly asserted over state waters further compounds § 303(b)(5)'s
discretionary powers.
12' Subject to the general consistency requirement of § 303(a)(1)(C) as well as the
federal jurisdictional exception of § 306(b), the Board regulations might well have
been enforceable under the FCMA machinery. The FCMA provides that "nothing in
this chapter shall be construed as extending or diminshing the jurisdiction or authority
of any State within its boundaries." FCMA, § 306(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1856 (1976). Fur-
thermore, subject to FCMA's qualifications, a state may directly or indirectly regulate
fishing outside its boundaries when the fishing vessel is registered under the laws of the
regulating state. Id.
The Bundrant record states that only the F.V. Billikin, owned and operated by
Bundrant, was registered in Alaska along with its gear. There is no mention of
registered vessels owned or operated by the other appellees. 546 P.2d at 534-35.
'12 Law of the Sea Conference III has been in session since December 1973, hav-
ing met five times without reaching agreement. Although some progress has been
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independent of the FCMA has been seriously eroded in favor of na-
tional conservation and management objectives.
Although the objectives of the FCMA may be national in scope
and ultimately guided by federal policy considerations, the FCMA
nevertheless ensures that fishery regulatory decisions will also reflect
the interests at stake in each region designated. 2 s Fishery plans will
evolve by reason of negotiation and compromise among member states
of each regional council. Consequently, it would be profitable at this
point to look into the makeup of a regional council since in essence
this is the heart of the FCMA's operative machinery. For purposes of
this inquiry, Alaska's membership in the North Pacific Council will
serve as an interesting example.
Even though Alaska's population is smaller in comparison to other
coastal states, it nevertheless is regarded as primarily a producer of fish
and accordingly has the largest council representation of any other mem-
ber state. Of the sixty-eight council representatives, Alaska has five, or
7.1% of the total. 2 4 In terms of representation within the North
Pacific Council, Alaska's position is even more dominant, controlling
71% of the seven appointed representatives. 2r Therefore, for all prac-
tical purposes, Alaska is the dominant force in the North Pacific
Council. At first blush, this control may seem unreasonable, but when
one considers that about forty percent of the total weight of fish
caught off United States shores in 1973 came from the waters off
Alaska, its percentage of representation becomes more apparent. 2 6
made in negotiations concerning fisheries management, other issues, principally
regulation of deep-seabed mining, have created obstacles to the conclusion of a widely
acceptable treaty.
l21 It is interesting to note that the council structure excludes most non-coastal
states from the fishery management decision-making process. There are 25 states and
four political subdivisions of the United States which are represented in the councils.
FCMA, § 302(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976). As a result 25 states do not participate in
fisheries management planning. Those states not included could be adversely affected
by regional management decisions which may prompt increased prices through reduc-
ed catch quotas and limiting supplies.
1" Id. § 302(a)(7), 16 U.S.C. § 1852.
It' Id. The North Pacific Regional Council is comprised of 11 voting members.
Alaska has six, five appointed by the Secretary of Commerce and one by the governor.
Washington has three, two appointed by the Secretary and one by the governor.
Oregon has none appointed by the Secretary and one by the governor. The eleventh
member is the National Marine Fisheries Service Regional Director.
I' The total catch off the United States in 1973 was 11.8 billion pounds. Approx-
imately 4.5 billion pounds of that amount came from Alaskan waters. ALASKA COM-
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Council representation is generally awarded according to a state's
fishery dependence. Examination of representation on a council-by-
council basis suggests that within certain regions coalitions between
states with the largest percentage of representation may emerge.' 2" To
a certain extent a portion of this discrepancy in the level of representa-
tion among some states will be negated by fishery officers appointed by
the Secretary of Commerce. These representatives will most probably
be concerned with satisfying the national standards of the FCMA in
drawing up fishery plans and will effectively diminish a state's ability
to monopolize the preliminary negotiations.
In further analyzing the structure and function of the fishery
management councils, it is logical to assume that the fishery represen-
tative appointed by the Governor will be chiefly sympathetic toward
state problems. All states will have a similar set of immediate concerns
and will act to protect their legitimate interests accordingly. The set of
local problems typical among Councils includes the condition of the
fishery resource, and the welfare of the fishermen and economic vitali-
ty of the industry within each state. Political issues such as the level of
unemployment and generation of income within a fishery will find
themselves recurring throughout the councils as well.
The regulations promulgated in Bundrant by the Fish and Game
Board came about as a result of overfishing, depletion of the resource
and the need to conserve and maintain crabbing as an important part
of the fishing industry within Alaska.128 Even though the motivating
factors behind Bundrant closely parallel those which exist under the
regional council structure, it is important to recognize that in Bun-
drant the affirmed state action unilaterally regulated extraterritorial
fishery areas without being concerned to any great degree with the ef-
fects of such regulatory action on neighboring states. 129 Similar action
MISSION ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE ALASKA POSITION ON IN-
TERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 3 (1977).
12 This presupposes that those members appointed by state governors would side
with their state in coalition efforts. All decisions by a council are by majority vote of
the voting members present and voting. A quorum on a council consists of a majority
of the voting members. FCMA, § 302(e)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976).
121 546 P.2d at 533, 540-41.
129 Id. at 540. The court cited language from Southern Pacific Co. v. Ariz., 325
U.S. 761, 767 (1945), indicating that a state had reserved powers to make laws govern-
ing matters of local concern even though there may be some effects upon interstate
commerce. But cf. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), where Mr.
Justice Jackson articulated the distinction between the power of a state to shelter its
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through the regional council framework will come about only through
a state's manipulation of the voting members and except for the North
Pacific Regional Council this appears highly unlikely. Moreover, the
additional barrier of conformity to national standards may also serve
as a prohibiting force on any one individual state's exertion of
unilateral power.
Nonetheless, to the extent that state and personal interests of the
federal appointees coincide, they may create, particularly in the North
Pacific Council, an Alaskan rather than a regional bias. On balance,
however, the Regional Fishery Management Councils represent a new
approach to the future management and conservation of fishery
resources. They possess qualities of both state and federal regulatory
authorities working toward an acceptable accommodation of interests.
Enforcement and administration of fishery plans and regulations will
be carried out by the respective federal agencies, yet local needs and
concerns shape day-to-day decision-making. An overall reconciliation of
local and national interests has been attempted and it can be an-
ticipated that the FCMA will aid in the development of a meaningful
and functional law of the sea for the immediate future.
D. International Considerations
Although the majority in Bundrant effectively evaded the question
of whether the Board's regulations conflicted with international
agreements or foreign rights, finding instead that such considerations
were speculative and remote,isO it is clear from a reading of the FCMA
that international relations are to be accorded primary importance.
Title II of the FCMA requires that any nation wishing to fish within
the 200 mile fisheries zone of the United States must sign a Governing
International Fishery Agreement (GIFA). s13 In addition, the FCMA
people from health and safety menaces, even where such dangers arise from interstate
commerce, and a state's lack of power to "retard, burden or constrict the flow of such
commerce for . . . economic advantage." Id. at 533.
Moreover, the Bundrant court found that the exercise of this jurisdiction in a
patently neutral fashion would not provoke retaliatory efforts by Alaska's neighboring
states. 546 P.2d at 540 (emphasis added).
110 546 P.2d at 540, At this point, the dissent stated that the whole area of
regulation of ocean resources was immersed in the international law field and accord-
ingly should not be regulated by individual states. Id. at 563w64. (dissenting opinion).
151 FCMA, §§ 201-05, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821-25 (1976). After February 28, 1977, the
FCMA prohibits foreign fishing within the fishery conservation zone or foreign fishing
for anadromous species or Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the zone unless
such foreign fishing is authorized by an international bilateral fishery agreement with
the United States Secretary of State. Id. § 201(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1821.
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dictates that existing fishing agreements be phased out if they pertain
to stocks subject to United States authority and are "in any manner in-
consistent with the purposes, policy or provisions of the Act."'3 2 Any
currently existing governing fishery agreements which are renegotiated
must adhere to prescribed terms and conditions under the FCMA. The
foreign nation and its vessels must officially recognize the exclusive
fishery management authority of the United States and abide by all
the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State.'"s Furthermore,
foreign nations must cooperate with certain enforcement and regula-
tion activities. 3 4 Applicable fees established by the FCMA must be
pre-paid,' foreign governments must maintain designated agents
within the United States who are authorized to recieve service of pro-
cess,136 and risk of loss for any damage to American vessels, fishing
gear or catch must be assumed as well.' 37 Once a foreign nation meets
these specifications, it is eligible to apply for permits licensing its
fishing vessels to enter designated fisheries where surpluses have been
determined to exist. Thus, whatever rationale was available to a court
in the past for avoiding consideration of international agreements upon
state fishery regulations must now be considered unpersuasive in light
of the FCMA.
The first GIFA to be negotiated was between the United States and
Poland on August 2, 1976.138 In accordance with the requirements of
the FCMA, the United States-Polish bilateral GIFA was submitted by
the President to Congress. Once submitted to Congress, the agreement
becomes subject to debate, revision, or suspension for a period of sixty
days. 13 9 It was later recommended by President Ford that the Congress
consider passage of a joint resolution bringing the agreement into force
since sixty days of continuous session as required by the FCMA was not
available before March 1, 1977.140 Congress did pass enabling legisla-
132 Id. § 202(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1822. Section 202(b) provides that "it is the sense of
Congress that the United States shall withdraw from any such treaty, in accordance
with its provisions, if such treaty is not so renogotiated within a reasonable period of
time after April 13, 1976."
M, Id. § 201(c), (c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1821.
114 Id. § 201(c)(2)(A)-(D), 16 U.S.C. § 1821.
"I Id. § 201(c)(2)(E), 16 U.S.C. § 1821.
11 Id. § 201(c)(2)(F), 16 U.S.C. § 1821.
11, Id. § 201(c)(2)(G), 16 U.S.C. § 1821.
118 E. McDOWELL, 1976 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 356.
139 FCMA, § 203, 16 U.S.C. § 1823 (1976).
140 E. McDOWELL, supra note 138, at 356.
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tion allowing the agreement to come into force prior to the expiration
of the minimum statutory period. Besides the United States-Poland
GIFA, five additional GIFAs were brought into force on February 21,
1977, through the Fishery Conservation Zone Transition Act."4
Despite these treaty successes, not all foreign countries were as will-
ing to renegotiate traditional fishing rights in United States waters pur-
suant to the provisions of the FCMA. Japanese Foreign Minister,
Shinichiro Asao, for example, publicly stated that Japan refused to
recognize the United States 200 mile fishery conservation zone. 142
Moreover, there are increasing fears that retaliatory measures initiated
by non-complying foreign governments against United States fishermen
will seriously cripple certain fishing industries. Tuna fishermen argue
that other nations, adopting the lead of the United States, will enact
fishery measures creating exclusive zones but will fail to exempt the
highly migratory species from their jurisdiction, thereby depriving tuna
fishermen of valuable fishery grounds and seriously jeopardizing the
growth of the industry.143
Domestically, the threat of exclusion from traditional fishing
grounds has taken on a different setting. In June 1977, the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission banned all bowhead whale hunting for
1978.144 Alaskan Eskimos won a lower court order in October 1977, which
instructed the State Department to file an official objection exempting
the Eskimos from the ban. 145 On appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals in Washington, D.C. reversed the ruling, stating that the lower
court's ruling would upset United States efforts to establish and ad-
minister effective international machinery for the protection of marine
4 H.R. Res. 240, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). The GIFAs given effect by the
Act and the dates on which they were signed are as follows: United States-China, Sept.
15, 1976; United States-German Democratic Republic, Oct. 5, 1976; United States-
Romania, Nov. 23, 1976; United States-Soviet Union, Nov. 26, 1976; United States-
Bulgaria, Dec. 17, 1976; and United States-Republic of Korea, Jan. 4, 1977. These
agreements comply with the provisions of the FCMA in every respect. See E.
MCDOWELL, supra note 138.
142 N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1976, § 1, at 14, col. 1 (city ed.). Japan opposes the
assertion of a unilateral fishing zone until it is sanctioned by international law. Fur-
thermore, a proposal submitted by Japan where it was to continue its traditional
fishing activities off America waters was rejected by the United States. Id.
143 Shrimp and salmon fishermen are equally concerned over the possibility of
Mexico denying the gulf shrimp industry a major portion of its resources. See Com-
ment, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 707 (1976).
144 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 7, 1977, at 113.
14 Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 953 (U.S. App. D.C. 1977).
Vol. 10:703
FCMA: ACCOMMODATION OF INTERESTS
mammals. 46 Alternative solutions are being sought by the National
Marine Fisheries Service in order to placate the irate bowhead hunters,
but for the moment they appear to be the victims of the same type of
FCMA policies which threaten the fishing of foreign nations in Ameri-
can waters.
Some foreign countries have also sought to circumvent the effects
of the FCMA by establishing business contacts in the continental
United States in order to secure the harvesting of traditional catch
quotas. 47 The Soviet Union, for example, has completed an arrange-
ment whereby it is an equal partner in a joint venture with an
American processing concern through which certain restrictions other-
wise applicable have been evaded.' 4  This new enterprise, US-USSR
Marine Resources, Inc., was formed in July 1976 between Bellingham
Cold Storage, a Washington State fish processor, and Sovrybflot, a
Soviet government agency. 49 The enterprise affords the Soviets access
to American fish stocks through the use of American fishermen in the
harvesting of hake, a fish now exploited primarily by foreign fishing
fleets. Processing of the catch will take place at Bellingham Cold
Storage. After processing, the fish will then be exported to the Soviet
Union on a continuous basis.'6 0
Although there are a number of friction areas developing as a
result of the FCMA's international influence, the long run effects of
the legislative measure should prove fruitful for the creation of a
lasting agreement on the use of ocean resources of the world. So long
as fishery depletion and overfishing continue to plague coastal nations,
compromising positions will have to emerge among conflicting in-
terests. In all instances it must be kept in mind that the FCMA at-
tempts to satisfy foreign fishing interests through a statutory scheme
calling for policies of full utilization, conservation, and efficient alloca-
tion of limited marine resources. In so doing, the FCMA may offer the
most realistic approach toward building a world consensus on future
regulation of living resources of the sea.
146 Id. at 955-56.
14 Such arrangements bear out the economic truth of the FCMA to foreign
fishing fleets-that traditional access to American fishery stocks could be reduced in
order to better accommodate domestic interests.
148 San Diego Union, Aug. 6, 1976, § A, at 12, col. 3.
149 Id.
110 Similar agreements are anticipated with the Japanese in their harvesting of
pollack and cod of American waters.
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II. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The passage of the FCMA may be regarded as a first step in a ma-
jor transition from an era of unlimited free fishing to a period of con-
trolled fishing pursuant to national jurisdictional mandates. In this
context, one should not view the FCMA as a panacea, but rather as a
forerunner to dramatic new opportunities in the area of fishery
management. The FCMA positions the United States as the leader in
the movement toward coastal state jurisdiction over marine resources.
Provision is made not only for the extension of jurisdiction but also for
the creation of effective machinery for the management over that
jurisdiction.
The FCMA allows states within the United States to assert substan-
tially the same interests in offshore marine resources as was possible
prior to the enactment of the FCMA. The change that takes place is in
the degree of control that the Federal Government now employs in the
establishment of national uniformity and consistency among regional
fishery plans. In view of the proliferation of economic and fishery
zones around the world, the national interest is served by allowing the
United States to speak with one voice encouraging the movement
toward a global agreement concerning ocean resources.
From an international perspective, the FCMA seeks to take account
of traditional fishing interests by foreigners off American coasts provid-
ed that such nations reach agreement with the United States pursuant
to the FCMA. Although reasonable fears are present, their importance
may be reduced somewhat as progress is made under the present con-
servation and management schemes. Moreover, it is very possible that
the same problems faced now would have occurred under the slower,
more ineffective, multilateral approach to fisheries questions of the
past. Furthermore, negotiating the integration of various exclusive zone
areas may prove a more fruitful alternative than contend-
ing with all the problems that arise in unruly multilateral conferences.
Thus, the machinery has been set in motion and it remains for inter-
national negotiators to effectively coordinate the plethora of existing
fishery regimes such as the one established by the United States.
ARTHUR J. TASSI*
* J.D,. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1979.
Vol. 10:703
